Using longitudinal data on practicing obstetricians from 1998 to 2004 derived from Pennsylvania, Florida, and New York hospital discharge data, this study finds that rising malpractice premiums are associated with an increased rate of exit and a reduced rate of entry for obstetricians. In Pennsylvania and Florida, where premiums rose by an average of 20% per year for four years, the combined effect of more exits and fewer entries was associated with a decline in obstetrical labor supply of 80 physicians, or 5.3% of the supply of obstetricians.
Malpractice Premiums and the Supply of Obstetricians
Using longitudinal data on practicing obstetricians from 1998 to 2004 derived from Pennsylvania, Florida, and New York hospital discharge data, this study finds that rising malpractice premiums are associated with an increased rate of exit and a reduced rate of entry for obstetricians. In Pennsylvania and Florida, where premiums rose by an average of 20% per year for four years, the combined effect of more exits and fewer entries was associated with a decline in obstetrical labor supply of 80 physicians, or 5.3% of the supply of obstetricians.
The medical malpractice environment has experienced several periods of great volatility over the past 30 years. The most recent crisis, which started in 2000, upset a decade of stability in premiums. It was characterized by average premium hikes of 15% per year, with particularly large premium increases in some geographic areas and in high-risk specialties such as neurosurgery and obstetrics (Rubin 2001; Guadagnino 2001) , resulting in abrupt shifts in the cost structure of some physician practices. Although this raised concerns that the availability of medical services may be reduced in certain communities, little evidence exists to support these claims.
This study uses rich new data to examine the direct relationship between the growth of malpractice premiums and the size and composition of the physician workforce specializing in obstetrics. The primary data sources for this project are statewide hospital discharge data sets from 1998 through 2004 from Pennsylvania, Florida, and New York. We first identify physicians practicing obstetrics in each state and each year by affirming whether hospital records indicate they performed deliveries in that year. Then, by linking physician information over time, we precisely determine the year when each physician stopped or started his or her obstetrical practice. We show that rising malpractice premiums increased the rate at which practicing obstetricians dropped their obstetrics practice and simultaneously reduced the rate of entry for new obstetricians.
Background Some argue that escalating malpractice premiums will lead to a decline in the supply of physicians in a market by inducing active physicians to stop practicing altogether through early retirement or departure from geographical areas with extremely high premiums (IOM 1989) , and simultaneously inducing prospective physicians to avoid specialties or geographic areas with high malpractice premiums. While anecdotal reports and physician surveys do support a declining physician supply in response to rising malpractice premiums, empirical results have been mixed with little convincing evidence of a direct relationship between premiums and physician supply.
Anecdotal reports of physicians walking out on their jobs to protest rapidly escalating malpractice premiums (Hirschorn 2003) have called attention to the threat rising malpractice premiums have on physician supply. The American Medical Association (AMA) declared 19 states to have a medical liability ''crisis'' due to rising premiums (AMA 2004) . In a survey of specialists in Pennsylvania by Mello and colleagues (2005) , specialists in the state reported that they were scaling back their practice and were more likely to retire early as a result of malpractice risk. The researchers also found that liability exposure was correlated with lower professional satisfaction (Mello et al. 2004) . A survey of obstetricians showed evidence that a significant number of physicians were either reducing or eliminating obstetrics from their practices in response to the increasing costs of professional liability (Dubay, Kaestner, and Waidmann 2001) . Further, a 1990 New York state physician survey found that 17% of obstetricians/gynecologists (OB/GYNs) who had ever practiced obstetrics had stopped performing deliveries. Of those who had discontinued obstetrics, one-third stated that the cost of malpractice insurance was the most important factor in their decision (Grumbach et al. 1997) .
Another set of papers has evaluated indirect evidence of the relationship between malpractice premiums and physician supply by examining whether the adoption of tort reform has increased physician supply. Tort reform may have an indirect effect on physician supply-if reforms successfully reduce damage awards (Danzon 1986; Zuckerman, Bovbjerg, and Sloan 1990) , the lower payouts would reduce liability premiums (Zuckerman, Bovbjerg, and Sloan 1990; Viscusi and Born 2005; Thorpe 2004 ), which then would increase physician supply. Encinosa and Hellinger (2005) examined changes in overall county-level physician supply between 1985 and 2000 and found an increase of 2.2% after states adopted tort reform in the form of damage caps. While they found no effect for OB/GYNs overall, they did find an increase in the number of practicing OB/GYNs in rural counties, but only if the cap equaled at least $250,000. Matsa (2007) , who used a longer time series (1970 to 2000) , found that caps do not affect physician supply for the average physician, but do increase the supply of rural specialist physicians by 11%. Kessler, Sage, and Becker (2005) found reforms, which include damage caps, increase physician supply at the state level by 2.4%, with the effect concentrated among high-risk specialties. Klick and Stratmann (2007) found associations between noneconomic damage caps and physician supply. While these studies suggest that tort reform leads to increases in physician supply, they generally ignore the possibility that states tend to pass reforms during periods of physician undersupply. Therefore, the measured association of reforms with increasing physician supply may merely be regression to the mean.
Finally, several recent papers have evaluated direct evidence of the relationship between malpractice premiums and physician supply. Baicker and Chandra (2005) , using changes between 1993 and 2001 in state-level physician supply and in malpractice premiums, found that changes in average statelevel malpractice liability premiums were uncorrelated with the changes in the size of the overall physician workforce. They also looked specifically at OB/GYNs and found no overall change in the size of the OB/GYN workforce and only a small negative effect on workforce size for older OB/GYNs in rural areas. Baicker and Chandra used the American Medical Association Masterfile (AMA Masterfile) to measure changes in physician supply. Yet Rittenhouse et al. (2004) found that the AMA Masterfile had a sensitivity of only 9% in detecting physicians who left clinical practice during the previous three years. This is primarily due to long lags in updating the Masterfile because information on changes in physician practices typically comes from an ongoing survey of the entire physician population that occurs every three to four years (Kletke et al. 2002) . Mello and colleagues (2007) looked at the relationship between malpractice premiums and the behavior of physicians in ''high-risk'' specialties in Pennsylvania over the years 1993 through 2002 using administrative records from the state-run insurance fund in which most Pennsylvania physicians must participate. They did not find that the malpractice crisis period was associated with a reduction in the scope of practice (for example, by eliminating high-risk procedures in the crisis period, 1999-2002, when compared to the pre-crisis period, 1993-1998). They did, however, find that high-risk specialists stopped practicing in Pennsylvania at a slightly higher rate during the crisis period. The greatest effect was seen in the specialty of OB/GYN, which declined in size by 8% between the pre-crisis period and the crisis period.
Conceptual Model
We hypothesize that an increase in malpractice premiums for obstetricians in a market will reduce the number of obstetricians practicing in that market; obstetricians will exit the market at a greater rate and new obstetricians will enter at a slower rate. We assume that physicians decide to practice in a particular specialty if the net benefits from practicing in that specialty exceed the net benefits they would receive in their next best alternative. A change in malpractice premiums relative to the alternatives changes the net benefit calculation. For most specialties, the new net benefit calculation rarely leads to a transition in physician specialty or location because the costs of the transition typically would involve a new three-to-five-year residency program and/or creating a new panel of patients in a new location (Ernst and Yett 1985) . However, for obstetricians, this transition may be more common. Because obstetricians are trained in both obstetrics and gynecology, and typically have a practice with a mix of obstetrical and gynecological procedures, they can transition between these specialties without additional training, and at lower costs. Thus, obstetricians can change the specialty that determines their premium rate-switching from obstetrics (with a higher premium) to gynecology (with a lower premium)-by just eliminating the obstetrical procedures from their practice. 1 The relatively low opportunity costs of exiting from obstetrical practice leads the specialty of OB/GYN to be potentially more responsive to changes in its malpractice premiums. This responsiveness comes in the form of exits rather than changes in volume because premiums do not change with volume. 2 Insurers set premiums on a prospective basis according to their expected payouts for providers in a particular specialty and geographic region estimated from past claim frequency and generosity. Individual experience rating is not widely used. Therefore, premiums tend to vary by geographic location and the risk of a physician's specialty. Premiums in some states-and even in certain counties within states-can differ in magnitude because markets vary in their litigiousness, regulation, and propensity for local courts to find for plaintiffs and/or to award high payments. While premium levels can be endogenous to other factors that may influence labor force transitions, this is less likely to have been the case for the factors that contributed to the abrupt changes in premium rates over the 1998-2003 period. Premium rate changes over this period were attributed largely to investment income losses and underpricing in prior years that may have resulted from uncertainty in the frequency and size of claims (Neale, Eastman, and Drake 2009 ). The changes differed across markets because varying levels of competitiveness led to inconsistent use of underpricing to vie for market share (Danzon 2000) .
Empirical Methods

Medical Malpractice Premium Data
The data on malpractice premiums at the county level come from the 1996 to 2005 Medical Liability Monitor Surveys. The Medical Liability Monitor conducts an annual nationwide survey of insurance companies on physician malpractice insurance premiums in the previous year for a fixed policy type for internal medicine, obstetrics, and general surgery. The survey collects premium data by regions within each state, where regions consist of individual counties or groups of counties. We identified all counties associated with each region for which premiums were reported in the survey. Therefore, the variation in premiums occurs at the county level. Premiums are adjusted to 2004 dollars using the medical consumer price index. In Figure 1, we report average malpractice insurance premiums from 1995 to 2004 for Pennsylvania, New York, and Florida. Premiums were steady in nominal terms and declining in real terms until 1999 in Florida and 2000 in Pennsylvania, when fairly sharp increases began. Between 1999 and 2004, average Florida premiums rose from $97,101 to $173,917 and average Pennsylvania premiums rose from $49,098 to $96,985. Premiums in New York continued to decline in real terms until 2002; New York did not experience sharp increases in premiums at any time over the study period.
Physician Data
We constructed an annual database of all physicians performing hospital deliveries in New York, Pennsylvania, and Florida using the state discharge data sets from 1998 and 2004 for each of these states. These hospital discharge data are patient-level data with variables identifying the hospital, patient zip code, principal discharge diagnosis, procedure codes, and the state license number of the attending physician for every hospital discharge within the state. These states were selected because their discharge data sets have the rare characteristic of containing physician license numbers that are consistent over time and linkable to other data sources. We identified the hospital discharges with procedure codes for a vaginal delivery or cesarean Our goal in creating the physician data set was to include those physicians who pay the OB premium and exclude those not responsible for performing deliveries. Thus, the physician data set was assembled by identifying the unique state license numbers of the attending physicians determined in the hospital discharge records as performing deliveries. Because miscoding in the ''attending'' field of the discharge data is possible, we excluded deliveries where the ''attending'' was unlikely to be the physician responsible for performing the delivery. There were four reasons for exclusion based on linking identified license numbers from the discharge data sets to the AMA Masterfile 3 from 1998 and 2004: the license number identified a midwife, nurse practitioner, or resident (2% of deliveries excluded); the primary or secondary specialty or the physician's residency training was not OB/GYN or family practice (FP) (.6%); the license number from the state discharge data set did not match any record in the AMA Masterfile (1.2%); or the physician averaged fewer than two deliveries per year (.06%). The 3.9% of excluded deliveries removed the unique state license numbers that we attributed to miscoding (36% of the 12,962 unique state license numbers). The final sample contained 8,240 physicians with training in obstetrical procedures either through residency in OB/GYN or FP. We refer to all physicians in our sample as obstetricians.
To ensure that the deliveries identified from the hospital state discharge data included the majority of all deliveries in those states, we benchmarked the number of hospital deliveries from discharge data to the same totals reported to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) through birth certificate data by state (Table 1). We found that 88% of the deliveries reported to the CDC were captured in the Florida discharge data, 76% in New York, and 93% in Pennsylvania. While there is no reason to suspect that capturing 84% of hospital deliveries will introduce bias (or 81% after exclusions for nonphysician attendings), if the number of deliveries in a state performed by nonphysicians has increased in response to higher malpractice premiums for physicians, then our study of hospital discharges may underestimate the response to malpractice premiums. We tracked the proportion of births captured in hospital dis- charge data over time and found the estimates were stable in Florida and New York at 84% and 85%, respectively, and declined slightly in Pennsylvania, from 81% to 79%. This relative stability led us to conclude that this underestimate would be small. We also compared the number of physicians identified as obstetricians in the state discharge data with the number of patient care OB/GYN physicians on the AMA Masterfile (Table 1) . 4 First, the number of physicians identified as obstetricians was up to 50% higher in the AMA Masterfile than in the discharge data set. This is because the selfidentification of a specialty of OB/GYN in the AMA Masterfile does not exclude those who currently practice gynecology exclusively. Second, there were substantial differences in the changes over time between the two data sources. The Masterfile suggests that the number of OB/GYN physicians increased by 2.1% between 2000 and 2004; the number of obstetricians as defined in our study from state discharge data declined by 8.4% between 2000 and 2004. There are two important advantages of our file over the AMA Masterfile in identifying changes in physician supply. First, the OB/GYN specialty category on the AMA Masterfile does not allow one to capture OB/GYN physicians who drop their obstetrics practice. Second, physicians who move from the state or drop active patient care altogether may not be captured on the AMA Masterfile until several years after the event (Rittenhouse et al. 2004) .
Physicians often practice in multiple hospitals, which may be located in different markets. We define a market as a county and, because premiums vary by county, we identified physician/county records uniquely. That is, physicians practicing in hospitals in more than one county have a unique record for each county characterizing their practice in that county. We construct our key dependent variables of exits and new physicians based on the annual counts of deliveries by each obstetrician within each county between 1998 and 2004. For the physicians who meet our definition as baby delivering physicians, exit occurs when they perform at least one delivery in a given county in year t and zero deliveries in that county in year t+1.
Similarly, we identify new physician entry into a market by examining whether a physician who performs at least one delivery in a given county in year t has zero deliveries in that county in year t21. It is possible for the same physician to exit the market and reenter in a subsequent period. These exit and entry cases are included separately in our analyses.
The control variables are derived from both the AMA Masterfile and the discharge data. We constructed physician personal and job characteristics from the linked AMA Masterfile data including sex, international medical graduate, age, board certified, selfidentified specialty of OB/GYN, practice arrangement, and two indicators of preference for current location of physician practice: if state of medical residency is the same as the state of physician's practice and if birth state is the same as the state of physician's practice. From the discharge data, we developed a set of characteristics of the physician's practice in a particular year based on the demographics of the patients available on the claims data, including the proportion of the physician's practice who were black, Hispanic, younger than age 18, older than age 35, and with an insurance status of Medicaid or uninsured. From the discharge data, we also estimated the size of each physician's obstetrical practice by the average number of deliveries performed by the physician annually in years of active practice.
Empirical Models
We consider obstetricians' labor supply transitions to depend on factors that affect the net benefits of their current obstetrics practice, which we measure with a comprehensive set of personal and practice characteristics including premiums. Empirically, physician exit and entry are considered separately in physician-level linear probability models.
Consider:
where i indexes physicians, c indexes markets, and t indexes time. In the exit model, Y ict represents a binary variable indicating whether physicians stopped practicing obstetrics in the subsequent calendar year in the same county, conditional on practicing in the calendar year.
In the new physician model, Y ict represents a binary variable indicating those who did not practice in that county in the previous year among those practicing obstetrics in that county in the current calendar year. For each of the models, we focus on b 1 , the estimated relationship between the log of obstetrician premiums at the county level, Prem ct , and Y ict . The vector X ict contains a set of physician personal and practice characteristics, and the error term consists of c c , which represents unmeasured time-invariant market characteristics that might influence labor supply, and e ict which represents physician-specific error. We estimate this model with county-level fixed effects in order to control for characteristics of a market that are correlated with physician supply decisions and premiums such as average physician earnings in the market. The possibility of unobserved time-varying changes across jurisdictions remains a potential source of bias.
We also include a model with interactions between the premium variable and physician characteristics to understand whether there are particular characteristics that are more likely to lead to exit or entry for a given change in premiums. Standard errors are adjusted for the correlation within counties given that this is the unit of observation for our key independent variable.
Model Results
Table 2 provides a summary of physician characteristics overall and by state. The number of deliveries performed varied across obstetricians, with 6% performing five or fewer deliveries in a year and 31% performing more than 100. Ninety percent of the ''obstetricians'' we identified reported their specialty as OB/GYN in the AMA Masterfile, with the remaining 10% in family or general practice. Average premiums over the entire 1998-2004 analytical period were $86,900. The average exit rate was 11.2% and the average rate of physician entry was 9.9%. Exit rates varied by state with the highest in Pennsylvania at 13.4%.
State-level trends in our analytic sample's labor market are displayed in Figure 2 . Figure 2A displays the total number of active obstetricians per county in the sample by state over time. There was some decline in all three states following the year 2000, when premiums started to rise dramatically in Florida and Pennsylvania (as shown in Figure 1 ). The largest decline was in Pennsylvania. As Figure 2B shows, as the number of active obstetricians declined, the remaining active obstetricians performed more deliveries. In Pennsylvania, the number of deliveries per active obstetrician jumped from 80 to 100 From the county-level fixed-effect linear probability model describing exit from the practice of obstetrics, we found that exit rates were significantly related to premiums (Table 3). The coefficient of .0283 suggests that for a 10% increase in premiums, the exit rate increases by .283 percentage points. 5 The other coefficients in the model show the many well-understood factors that contribute to practice exit, such as age over 65 and fewer deliveries. We see that exit was lower for physicians with a strong attachment to their state as measured by medical residency and birth in that state. Exit also was greater among high-Medicaid practices. The interaction model shows the factors that are more sensitive to a change in premium. Somewhat surprisingly, physicians with a high number of deliveries were more likely to exit when premiums rose and older physicians were less likely to exit when premiums rose. We also found higher exit rates with higher premiums among physicians who were board certified, did not identify themselves as OB/GYNs (i.e., family practice physicians), and had a high proportion of Medicaid patients.
From the linear probability model describing new physician entry into the practice of obstetrics, we found that entry of physicians was significantly negatively related to premiums (Table 4 ). The coefficient of 2.0383 suggests that for a 10% increase in premiums, the rate of entry decreases by .383 percentage points. The other coefficients in the model characterize new physicians as having smaller practices, more likely to be female and younger, less likely to be board certified, more likely to be an OB/GYN, and more likely to have a practice with a higher proportion of Medicaid or uninsured patients. When these characteristics were interacted with premiums, we saw that when premiums rose, the new physicians performed more deliveries and were less likely to identify within the specialty of OB/GYN. The patients that the new physicians saw were more likely to be the types of patients seen by the physicians most likely to exit following a rise in premiums: blacks, Hispanics, older patients, and those on Medicaid or uninsured.
We display the coefficients on premiums for alternative specifications of the exit and new physician models in Table 5 . When the model was run without county fixed effects, the magnitude of the results for both the exit and new models was diminished, suggesting that premiums tend to be higher in areas where fixed area factors make a market attractive for established and newer physicians. When the variables that characterize the patients in the practice by race, age, and insurance status were removed, the exit model result got stronger and the new physician model got weaker, suggesting that countylevel studies of labor force transitions are limited by their inability to include patientlevel controls. The results were robust to alternative specifications of the premium variable. The magnitude of the coefficient changed only slightly when premiums were lagged or when premiums-rather than log of premiums-were used. 6 The results also were robust to shifting the margin of analysis to the intensive margin. We see this in the bottom three sensitivity analyses. First, results were maintained when observations were weighted by the average deliveries performed by each physician rather than treating each physician with the same weight. Second, results were maintained when the smallest practices were removed. Third, results were maintained for exiting physicians, but not for new physicians, when those ''physicians'' who were removed because they were identified as noisy data were included. The positive effect for new physicians suggests that as premiums rise, there may be an increase in the ''attendings'' that get listed on the discharge data. In summary, this extensive sensitivity analysis suggests that the positive association between premiums and exit and the negative association between premiums and entry are broadly robust.
Limitations
Our approach does have some limitations in being able to estimate a strict causal relationship between labor force transitions and malpractice premiums. While our county fixed-effects specifications address bias that could result from the possibility that those areas that are most attractive for physicians may also be the same areas that tend to have higher malpractice premiums, the fixed- . Among other things, this bill effectively reduced premiums in order to retain physicians hit hardest by the rapid rise in premiums. Unmeasured time-varying characteristics limit the ability to draw direct causal inference. It is also possible that the premium changes themselves are not entirely exogenous. While Neale, Eastman, and Drake (2009) did attribute premium changes to largely exogenous factors, physician exits might lead to higher premiums for the fewer remaining physicians who are faced with a higher volume of deliveries and hence greater perphysician risk. For these reasons, our findings may not be strictly causal, but may impart useful information regarding an underlying association between premiums and physician supply.
Conclusions
This analysis finds that increasing malpractice premiums are associated with declines in the supply of physicians who practice obstetrics, with a larger number of physicians exiting the In total, rising malpractice premiums in this state is associated with a decline in obstetrical labor supply of 80 physicians or 5.3% of the labor supply. 7 The relationship between rising malpractice premiums and labor force transitions differed by physician practice characteristics. Physicians who performed more deliveries and specialized in family practice rather than OB/ GYN were more likely to exit the market and more likely to enter as premiums rose. Exiting physicians had a larger proportion of the more vulnerable patients-Medicaid/uninsured, minority, and older-but entering physicians were more likely to have these patients in their new practices. Of note, we did not find support for the conventional wisdom that premium increases have a larger impact on physicians nearing retirement age.
While we found a meaningful change in physician labor supply following a change in premiums, most prior research in this area has not. This apparent contradiction in results may be the result of the more detailed data we used to identify practicing obstetricians. Most prior studies have relied on the AMA Masterfile to define the cohort of practicing obstetricians (Encinosa and Hellinger 2005; Matsa 2007; Kessler, Sage, and Becker 2005; Klick and Stratmann 2007; and Baicker and Chandra 2005) . As noted earlier, the AMA Masterfile is the result of triennial surveys, which have significant nonresponse and lag times of up to two years or more in detecting changes in physician labor supply (Rittenhouse et al. 2004 ). In addition, the AMA Masterfile does little to differentiate between OB/GYNs who practice obstetrics and those who confine their practice to gynecology. As already mentioned, the labor supply of obstetricians may be particularly sensitive to increasing malpractice premiums because obstetricians can significantly reduce their premiums without having to relocate by dropping their obstetrical practice. Our ability to precisely observe when obstetricians exit the market may also explain why we found large differences in the physician labor supply not observed in most other studies. Our results for obstetricians are consistent with those of Mello et al. (2007) , who also used a data source that was more precise in capturing physician exit than the AMA Masterfile; however, with detailed physicianlevel data we also were able to describe physicians who were most likely to experience transitions following changes in malpractice premiums. Notes: Unless otherwise indicated, the coefficient is for log premiums in a linear probability model with county fixed effects that include the following control variables: log deliveries, male, osteopath, IMG, age, board certified, OB specialty, practice type, residency and birth in state, and percentage of mothers in practice who are Hispanic, black, teenagers, over 65, and Medicaid/uninsured. Unless otherwise indicated, sample size is 34,545 for exit and 33,969 for new physicians.
By identifying the physician workforce specializing in obstetrics using state discharge data sets for Pennsylvania, Florida, and New York from the period 1998-2004, we show that rising malpractice premiums are associated with an increased rate of exit and a reduced rate of entry for obstetricians. In states like Pennsylvania and Florida-where premiums were rising by 20% per year between 2000 and 2004-the combined effect of more exits and reduced entry was associated with a decline in obstetrical labor supply of 80 physicians, or 5.3% of the supply of obstetricians.
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1 For most states, according to insurance companies, all physicians who intend to practice obstetrics face the level of risk for obstetricians and are required to hold this higher level of malpractice insurance even if they only deliver one baby. If procedures are performed in multiple risk categories, the premium is that of the higher category of risk. Therefore, obstetricians cannot avoid obstetrical premiums by simply changing the proportion of obstetrical procedures they perform; they must drop all obstetrical procedures to qualify for this lower premium. There are exceptions, however. In Florida, physicians are permitted to practice without liability coverage, but only about 5% ''go bare'' (Kachalia, Choudhry, and Studdert 2005) . This is also relevant for family and general practitioners who face higher premiums if they perform deliveries. 2 Even in the case of perfectly elastic demand where reimbursement rates rise to cover the higher malpractice premiums, lower-volume obstetricians would still face a reduction in net benefits from higher malpractice premiums because the costs of malpractice premiums are generally fixed, regardless of the number of procedures performed during that year. 3 The AMA Masterfile is an administrative database maintained by the AMA. It contains demographic and practice characteristics on every licensed physician in the Unites States regardless of AMA membership status. 4 The number of OB/GYN physicians on the AMA Masterfile in active patient care is reported at the county level in the Area Resource File (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2007). 5 To be clear on how we arrived at this calculation, consider the derivative of our regression equation, y5blnP. We get dy/ dp5b/P which can be rewritten as dy5bdp/P. Therefore, if dp/p5.1 or 10%, then dy5.1b. If b52.0283, then dy5.00283, which is equivalent to.283 percentage points. 6 Average premiums were $86,900, so a 10% change of $8,690 would result in Dy5 .0330*(8,690/100,000)5.00287. This is nearly identical to the main result where Dy5 .0283*.15.00285. 7 Thirty-four exiting physicians5.0283*(20%* 4*1,500). Forty-six fewer new physicians5 2.0383*(20%*4*1,500).
